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The Possibility of Critical Mini-Publics: Realpolitik and Normative Cycles in Democratic Theory1 
Marit Boeker (University of Essex) and Stephen Elstub (University of the West of Scotland) 
 
Abstract 
Fifty years ago, democratic theory was largely devoid of normative impulse, and was dominated by 
the realpolitik and positivist approaches of competitive elitism and rational and social choice theory. 
While the rise of participatory democratic theory in the 1970s brought a halt to this dominance, it 
was the arrival of deliberative democracy in the 1980s and 90s that cemented the normative revival 
in democratic theory. However, as deliberative theory itself increasingly emphasised practice-
oriented institutional innovations such as “mini-publics”, realpolitik has made a resurgence, 
rendering deliberative democracy less normative and critical. Yet, although in practice the focus on 
mini-publics has sometimes resulted in less critical forms of deliberation, we argue that this need not 
be the case. An important task of deliberative theory today is to find ways in which deliberative 
democracy can be practically relevant without losing its critical and normative edge. We contend that 
experimentation with new forms of mini-publics can contribute to this if located within a deliberative 
system where their deficiencies can be corrected and supplemented by other parts of the system. 
We conclude by arguing that deliberative democracy has cemented itself as one of the most 
powerful innovations of democratic theory yet precisely because it can motivate practical innovation 
on the ground whilst still retaining a strong normative force and critical edge as well. This shows that 
there need not be an insurmountable divide between theories being either realpolitik or critical, and 
for democratic theory it is important that both are achieved in the right measure. 
 
 
                                                          
1 We are very grateful for the insightful comments provided by Ian O’Flynn and Hugh Ward on earlier drafts of 
this article. 
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Introduction 
Fifty years ago, democratic theory was largely devoid of normative impulse, and was dominated by 
the realpolitik and positivist approaches of competitive elitism, rational and social choice theory. 
While the rise of participatory democratic theory in the 1970s brought a halt to this dominance, it 
was the arrival of deliberative democracy in the 1980s and 90s that cemented the normative revival 
in democratic theory. However, as deliberative theory itself increasingly emphasised institutional 
innovations such as “mini-publics” to achieve deliberative democracy in practice, realpolitik has 
made a resurgence, rendering deliberative democracy less normative and critical. In this article, we 
argue that, while mini-publics have many important functions in modern democracies, they 
potentially contribute to a weakening of the normative impulse of democratic theory that coined the 
origins of deliberative democratic theory. Yet this need not be the case: We argue that it is possible 
to build on the dominant concept of mini-publics in a way that harnesses both the critical-normative 
impulse and the real-world innovations of deliberative democracy, and conceptualise, against this 
background, a type of “critical mini-publics” that fits in with a normative and critical orientation of 
deliberative democratic theory. We conclude that deliberative democracy has cemented itself – and 
will continue – as one of the most powerful innovations of democratic theory yet precisely because it 
can motivate practical innovation on the ground whilst at the same time retaining a strong normative 
force and critical edge as well. This shows that there need not be an insurmountable divide between 
theories being either realpolitik or critical, and for democratic theory it is important that both are 
achieved in the right measure. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section provides a broad documentation of realpolitik and 
normative cycles in democratic theory over the last fifty years, particularly noting the normative 
momentum provided by the development of deliberative democratic theory and its focus on critical 
opposition. Section two highlights how deliberative democracy’s “empirical turn” towards mini-
publics has helped refute the critiques of empirical democratic theorists, yet has also implied a new 
realpolitik direction for deliberative democracy itself, sidelining the theory’s critical origins. 
Advocating a new normative (re-)turn that harnesses mini-publics’ positive contributions whilst re-
orientating them towards the early critical deliberative norms, section three evaluates the various 
types of mini-public according to their critical potential, and section four argues that a new type of 
“critical mini-public” can indeed become a possibility by re-modelling mini-publics’ features towards 
greater openness and decisiveness whilst subjecting their practice to democratic control.  
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Realpolitik and Normative Cycles in Democratic Theory  
The last fifty years have witnessed numerous cycles in democratic theory with varying normative and 
realpolitik approaches. In 1960, when the first issue of Representation was published, the study of 
democracy was largely dominated by the realpolitik approaches competitive elitism, rational and 
social choice theory. Although published in 1942, the legacy of Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism 
and Democracy (1972) was still manifest in the 1960s. In this classic realpolitik text, Schumpeter 
argues that democracy conceived as rule of the people is impossible because citizens lack the 
capacity to form this will. Here he differentiates between political and market preferences. Unlike 
the latter, the former are indefinite because citizens rarely feel the consequences of them directly. 
Thus, citizens lack the necessary incentives to become informed about political issues and to develop 
concrete preferences, and are therefore unable to propose coherent policy solutions themselves. 
This enables a herd instinct to manifest itself, whereby these irrational citizens act on impulse and 
prejudice, becoming easily swayed by advertising, propaganda, and rhetoric produced by competing 
elites. Moreover, even if these individual political wills were definite and independent they would be 
too diverse to be formed into a coherent collective will, as neither rational argument nor decision 
rules are able to reconcile various preferences and values. Schumpeter concludes that democracy is 
still possible, providing it is defined as competition amongst elites for votes, where the only input 
required by citizens is to vote in periodic elections to choose their rulers. These elections do not 
mean the rulers are held to account, but, rather, they compete to impose their views on the 
electorate: ‘Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the 
men who are to rule them… democracy is the rule of the politician’ (Schumpeter 1972: 285). As 
Mackie (2009: 128-9) comments, ‘in the name of realism, his definition stripped democracy of all 
ethical content.’  
A few years before the first issue of Representation followed another influential realpolitik text: 
Downs’s An Economic Theory of Democracy (1956), elaborating on Schumpeter’s theory, similarly 
argued that democracy should be conceived as a competition for power. It became a seminal text in 
the development of rational choice theory, which subsequently established itself as a dominant 
approach to understanding political mechanisms and behaviour. One of the primary differences 
between Downs and Schumpeter, however, is that Downs started from the premise that citizens are 
rational utility maximisers, who are the best judge of their own interests. Consequently, democracy is 
interpreted as competition between rational actors, but not just between elites, as the electorate 
also compete to have their wishes and demands met. On this view, voters vote for the party that 
offers them more of what they want, and so political parties competing for votes try to offer the 
majority of the electorate what they want in order to get voted into government, leading to centrist 
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ideologies being adopted by parties, and associated moderate policies. As a consequence, there are 
no ideological or normative actors, either parties or voters, operating in electoral systems; each actor 
simply pursues their own self-interest. Still, Downs’ approach resembles that of Schumpeter’s in that 
he argues that due to the time and effort involved, and the impossibility of determining the electoral 
outcome (i.e. nobody wins by just one vote), it is irrational for individual citizens to vote, and 
certainly to take the time and effort to become an informed voter. As with Schumpeter’s analysis, 
then, citizens are ultimately ill-informed with indefinite preferences. However, in Downs’ analysis 
voters are not necessarily manipulated by elites, and use heuristics to make electoral choices.  
Finally, the seminal social choice theorist Arrow, in Social Choice and Individual Values (1963), 
considered the key problem of how to aggregate individual preferences to make a collective decision 
or social choice.  He set out five conditions that must be met to ensure a rational social choice, but 
argued that these requirements cannot in fact be satisfied at the same time through the same 
aggregative procedure. ‘Condorcet’s Paradox’ highlights how intransitive and rotating majorities, in 
conjunction with strategic voting, make it almost impossible to ensure rational outcomes in the sense 
that a vote reflects the will of the people. Arrow’s (1963) conclusion was that the only way these 
criteria could be met is through the restriction of the domain and range of preferences citizens could 
vote upon, which he argued was unacceptable as it would violate citizen autonomy. While there are 
then normative aspects in Arrow’s analysis, in applying his conclusions further, Riker, in Liberalism 
Against Populism (1982), all but dilutes these. Riker famously argued that all aggregation 
mechanisms are susceptible to instability and ambiguity, which allows for strategic manipulation. 
They are unstable in the sense that they spawn cyclical and intransitive social orderings and 
majorities, as a consequence of which voting paradoxes occur. All these problems mean that popular 
will cannot be identified independently from the aggregative mechanism used to identify it. As such, 
the outcomes of votes can be controlled by agenda setters and timing in terms of where in a voting 
cycle a decision is actually made. For Riker, ‘populist’ democracy is impossible as there is no such 
thing as ‘the will of the people’ that should be reflected in decisions (Riker 1982: 117-19). Democracy 
must therefore be abandoned ‘not because it is morally wrong, but merely because it is empty’ (Riker 
1982: 239). He concludes that the only purpose of elections is for citizens to remove competing 
officials from office if they distrust them, in order to prevent tyranny. Cohen’s (1986) critique of 
Riker’s avocation of elections demonstrates the absence of normativity in Riker’s analysis; for if 
elections do produce random outcomes, suitable and trustworthy candidates are as likely to be 
removed from office as unsuitable and untrustworthy ones. Random assassinations, a mechanism 
with no normative democratic credentials, might then be more useful in constraining power in 
providing external checks. 
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It is important to note that these works do not conclusively define democratic theory of that period. 
A notable exception is Dahl’s (1956; 1961; 1971) liberal pluralism which had overt normative 
impulses and looked beyond electoral competition to deliver democracy. He advocated continuous 
competition between diverse interest groups to influence government policy and promote polyarchy. 
Still, even Dahl’s approach is interpreted by some as an explanatory, rather than a normative, theory 
(Manley 1983). Therefore, while acknowledging important exceptions, the significance and the 
common themes embodied by competitive elitism and rational and social choice theory demarcate a 
distinct phase of theorising on democracy. All conclude that only a minimalist approach to 
democracy is possible, with elections used to facilitate competition, but not to deliver the will of the 
people. The empirical evidence that supports each approach is usually positivist and gathered from 
surveys and election studies (e.g. Berelson 1952; Converse 1964), leading to the development of 
‘empirical democratic theory’ (Berelson 1952). This empirical theory suggests most citizens to be 
politically apathetic and ignorant, but also that this is ‘functional for the democratic system’ 
(Pateman 2012: 7). Since these theories draw their conclusions from their interpretations of actually 
existing democracy, they are all realpolitik positions. Of course, their analysis of actually existing 
democracy could be disputed; yet the point we want to highlight in this paper is that these 
approaches lack a normative and critical edge. They accept too readily democracy as it operates, 
rather than engaging in an analysis of what democracy should and could be, which could itself guide 
political change. Consequently, all three approaches are guilty of justifying ‘in an ideological and 
specifically conservative spirit- the existing workings of the political system they have described’ 
(Skinner 1973: 288). 
In contrast, we agree with Arblaster (1994: 3) that democracy is ‘a concept before it is a fact’, and 
moreover a normative and critical concept ‘by which reality is tested and undertaken’ (Arblaster 
1994: 8). As Elstub (2010a: 255) elaborates, democratic theory ‘should criticise and guide practice…’; 
and this requires ‘a critical distance from practical reality’, which is absent in the work of empirical 
democratic theorists. Inasmuch as the normative claims of legitimacy, that are central to democracy, 
cannot be empirically verified, it is not possible to study democracy in a manner free of normative 
assumptions (Thompson 2008); and from this follows that ‘one should not accept political reality as a 
reified given, and essentialise the contextual features and the political procedures currently in place. 
Rather empirical theory must keep sight of the normative goals of democratic theory, and strive to 
improve practice, accordingly, where possible’ (Elstub 2010a: 255). 
Indeed, a more normative approach to democratic theory emerged in the 1970s as participatory 
democratic theorists ‘took up the cudgels against proponents of a realistic democratic theory’ 
(Pateman 2012:  7) by asserting that citizens, in the right circumstances, could and should participate 
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effectively in democratic processes (Pateman 1970; MacPherson 1977; Barber 1984). Participatory 
democrats argued that it was neither the inability of citizens to participate, nor their rational choice 
not to, that led to political apathy, but rather socio-economic inequalities that determined 
participation levels and the extent of the opportunities available to citizens to participate. Moreover, 
they maintained that opportunities to directly participate in decisions that affect them will enable 
people to gain the skills to participate, ensure that citizens take an interest in politics, and overcome 
the instrumental rational barriers to political participation identified by rational choice theorists. 
These debates, then, ‘were about the meaning of democracy itself – “realistic” or participatory?’ 
(Pateman 2012: 10). However, this normative turn was short-lived, as by the 1980s ‘participatory 
democratic theory became unfashionable’ (Pateman 2012: 7). 
Yet in the late 1980s and 1990s, the theory of deliberative democracy emerged heralding a 
distinctive normative vision and approach to democracy that took participatory democracy as its 
starting point, but made stronger normative claims on preferred types of political participation, 
specifically reasoned and reciprocal public discussion. For many, deliberative democracy has since 
‘overtaken and subsumed its predecessor of participatory democracy’ (Pateman 2012: 8). A key text 
in the early development of deliberative democracy was Habermas’s The Structural Transformation 
of the Public Sphere (1992), which, though first published in German in 1962 shortly after the 
inaugural issue of Representation, did not achieve its full impact until translated into English in 1989. 
The main argument of these early foundations of deliberative democracy was that there is in fact a 
‘public sphere’, and that it plays a key role in democracies in checking government power through 
critical debate. According to the new standard of legitimacy that subsequently emerged in 
deliberative theory on this basis, ’outcomes are legitimate to the extent they receive reflective assent 
through participation in authentic deliberation by all those subject to the decision in question’ 
(Dryzek 2010: 23).  
Repudiating as it does both elitist and aggregative models of democracy (Dryzek 2010: 23; Chambers 
2003: 308), and approaching democratic theorising from the starting point of this highly demanding 
ideal of deliberative legitimacy resting on equal access, reasoned justification, and exclusion of 
coercion (cf. Habermas 1996: 228-30; Dryzek 2000: 2), the arrival of deliberative democracy marked 
a significant shift from positivism towards radical normativity in democratic theory. Unlike the earlier 
empirical theories, deliberative democracy is not first and foremost a new explanation of existing 
democratic life, but its Habermasian foundations are as a critical theory, justifying deeper 
democratisation as a norm to resist illegitimate hierarchies and elitist governance structures. In 
normatively demanding an active public sphere through which citizens engage in the deliberative 
processes needed to meaningfully give ‘reflective assent’ (cf. Benhabib 1996: 68), the theory itself 
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harbours an empowering or emancipatory momentum (Knops 2006: 594). Whilst deliberation as such 
can be employed to a plethora of ends in different contexts, including public education and more 
efficient governance (Fung 2003), and the theory has by some also been interpreted in more 
reformist ways orientated to improving existing liberal institutions (e.g. Bessette 1994; Uhr 1998), 
deliberative democracy from this critical perspective means first and foremost respect for a new 
standard of democratic legitimacy (Parkinson 2006: 4): one which empowers citizens to ‘criticize 
institutions that do not live up to the normative standard’ (Chambers 2003: 308, emphasis added). 
Yet, deliberative democracy has itself undergone variations and cycles of normativism and realism. 
Elstub (2010b) identifies three main ‘generations’ of deliberative democratic theory. First generation 
deliberative democrats, such as Habermas (1996) and Rawls (1993), debated the normative 
justifications of deliberative democracy, interpretations, and necessary components of the theory, 
but were swiftly criticised for failing to take account of the sheer complexity of contemporary 
societies (Elstub, 2010b). Second generation deliberative democrats, particularly Bohman (1996) and 
Gutmann and Thompson (1996), initiated a shift towards considering the institutionalisation of 
deliberative democracy, reforming the theory of deliberative democracy in important respects, such 
as those relating to the aim of consensus, and to different forms of communication. On this basis, 
third generation theorists could begin to experiment with real-world institutional innovation (Elstub, 
2010b). This shift in the third generation has led to a proliferation of diverse interpretations 
regarding the institutional features of a deliberative model of democracy, known as the ‘empirical’ 
and ‘institutional turns’ in deliberative democracy (Dryzek 2010: 6-9). 
In demonstrating that the theory has practical impact, the empirical turn has proved vital for the 
development of deliberative democracy, indeed being regarded as key to the ‘coming of age’ of the 
theory (Bohman 1998). However, it has brought with it certain dangers, too. For Elstub (2010b: 305), 
‘if deliberative democracy accommodates the features of social complexity too excessively, and 
comes to resemble the current institutional frameworks too closely, it will be more amenable to 
practice, but will cease to be a critical theory that offers a radical alternative to liberal democracy, 
and the distinct features of the deliberative model will be lost’. The concern is that deliberative 
democracy could become an ‘empirical democratic theory’ like those it provided such a powerful 
critique of at its origins, and lose its normative and critical credentials. Although an empirical turn in 
deliberative democracy was required, a revival of the initial normative turn is now essential to reflect 
on this evidence from the perspective of the theory’s original critical orientation. Specifically, we 
argue in the remainder of this paper, the extensive focus on “mini-publics” that has accounted for 
much of deliberative democracy’s empirical turn (Elstub 2014) has contributed towards deliberative 
democracy’s drift away from its original normative and critical origins towards a more realpolitik 
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orientation. Yet, despite this, given their current dominance, mini-publics are still a useful starting 
point for conceptualising the possibility of a new “normative turn” in deliberative democracy that 
does not deny their successes, but re-orientates them from this perspective.  
 
Mini-publics and Realpolitik 
Thus, it is important to start our discussion of mini-publics by acknowledging the vital contribution 
they have made to the development of deliberative democracy. Mini-publics have been the 
democratic innovation from which the majority of empirical evidence on deliberative democracy has 
derived, which has in fact been crucial for testing and further elaborating the normative claims of 
deliberative democrats (Setälä and Herne 2014: 57) and thus for challenging the empirical 
democratic theories. Although these empirical democratic theorists were concerned with democracy 
at the large scale, whereas mini-publics operate on a small scale with a sample of citizens, Niemeyer 
(2014: 185) argues that ‘in principle, the effect of mini-public deliberation should be scalable in a 
broad sense…’ as ‘we are talking about the roughly same population in mass-publics, with the same 
capabilities as those observed in mini-publics.’ In sum, the evidence from mini-publics suggests that 
under good conditions citizens do have the ability to deliberate effectively together on complex 
issues, refuting the very basis of competitive elitism. Furthermore, deliberators’ preferences become 
more informed and considered, thereby correcting cognitive errors and ensuring they are logically 
connected with respect to values, causal connections, and policy preferences. Post-deliberative 
preferences are also more ‘public regarding’ (Fishkin 2009; Elstub 2014). The various types of random 
and stratified selection employed to gather a sample of citizens enhances descriptive representation 
and reduces the chance of systematic exclusion (Smith 2009: 80; Fishkin 2009: 111), so that the 
socio-economic biases characteristic of most types of traditional forms of participation are 
ameliorated. Deliberative mini-publics also reduce the reasons for rational ignorance. Once a citizen 
has been selected and has agreed to participate in a mini-public, the opportunity to influence the 
outcome provides an incentive to become informed. Once informed, these citizens are less likely to 
use heuristic shortcuts to settle on a policy position, which in turn makes their preferences less 
malleable by elites (Fishkin 2009). Deliberation can make lines of disagreement clearer, so a more 
suitable choice of aggregation mechanism can be made; and, related to this, deliberative democracy 
can lead to more single peaked preferences, which reduces the dimension of disagreement and 
cycling. Finally, public reasoning can reduce strategic participation due to the public nature of the 
debate (Miller 1993; Dryzek 2000; Dryzek and List 2003; Mackie 2003; List 2007). Arguably, then, 
mini-publics help overcome the problems for democracy presented by rational choice theory and 
social choice theory. 
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Despite these numerous and significant benefits, mini-publics are an institutional ideal-type that very 
much reflects the third generation of deliberative democracy (Elstub 2010b). The rationale for mini-
publics is based on the premise that deliberative democracy is so difficult to achieve in practice that 
it will not occur naturally, and so the conditions for democracy need to be artificially created. As a 
result, as  ‘large […] theoretical questions about the nature of democratic legitimacy are being 
replaced by a growing interest in the nuts and bolts of deliberative institutions’ (Chambers 2009: 
329), a more realpolitik approach has become dominant in the third generation of deliberative 
democracy itself. There is no doubt that barriers to the elements of deliberative democracy occurring 
‘naturally’ in the public sphere are substantial, yet this rationale for using mini-publics risks diluting 
the theory’s earlier strongly normative and critical orientation, as this democratic innovation ‘still 
leaves intact the conventional institutional structures and political meaning of “democracy” 
(Pateman 2012: 10) that make ‘naturally’ occurring deliberative democracy unlikely to materialise in 
the first place. Thus, the recent surge of mini-publics may have popularised the idea of deliberation 
in practical policy-making, but it has been a mixed blessing for deliberative democracy as a normative 
theory of democratic legitimacy centred around bottom-up critique.  
The Critical Limitations of Mini-Publics 
To a certain degree, mini-publics can theoretically provide a space for such bottom-up critique. There 
are many promising examples of mini-publics that have directly shaped policy-making, exerted 
pressure on governments to reconsider their official line, and mobilised citizens to engage more 
actively in political debates (Goodin and Dryzek 2006). However, it might be criticised that in doing 
so, mini-publics have over-emphasised the aspect of control and meticulous design to the detriment 
of democratic theory (cf. Chambers 2009: 332-4). Indeed, short of realising the critical, empowering 
momentum inherent in the normative theory of deliberative democracy, mini-publics are ‘not a 
method led by citizens, in a truly bottom-up sense, but one which is extremely useful to policy-
makers’ (Delap 2001: 39), with citizens themselves perceiving them as ‘top-down’ processes 
(Parkinson 2006: 16, 71). Their potential empowering effects are thus counteracted by the top-down 
planning and control involved with running mini-publics. Therefore, mini-publics have so far tended 
to be ‘elite-driven’ (Warren 2009: 6); and have in some cases been used instrumentally and 
strategically (Dryzek et al. 2009: 284; Dryzek and Tucker 2008: 870). Since it is mostly the organisers 
of the mini-public that select the ‘experts’ that participants get to question, the discussion can 
exclude important information and viewpoints from the start (Davidson and Elstub 2014: 375; Smith 
and Wales 2000: 58); and their control of the agenda as well as the timing and institutional design  
potentially allows them to ‘manipulate the results’ (Tucker 2008: 136; see also O’Flynn and Sood 
2014; Ward et al. 2003: 288). Moreover, government authorities have discretion over the extent and 
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in what ways the mini-public influences formal policy-making, allowing them to “cherry-pick” their 
preferred recommendations (Smith 2009: 93; see also Parkinson 2006; Elstub 2014; O’Flynn and 
Sood 2014). Consequently, mini-publics have been criticised as potentially ‘becom[ing] useful 
legitimating devices for an already-decided policy’ (Pateman 2012: 9), and a kind of setting to which 
’protest and opposition are ill-suited’ (Warren 2009: 8). Of course, most mini-publics are well-
intended, and only few outright manipulative (though see e.g. Freschi and Mete 2009). Still, to the 
extent that the artificial, top-down design of democratic institutions can itself distort citizens’ views 
and public discourse, mini-publics can be problematic from an emancipatory perspective even if run 
by well-meaning organisers.  
However, from such critiques does not necessarily follow that mini-publics could not, or should not 
contribute to the practice of deliberative democracy at all. As argued above, the fact that mini-
publics can purposively facilitate deliberation still makes them a potentially valuable tool for ensuring 
fairness and equalising access to political debates, including contestatory and critical ones. Thus, it is 
not an outright dismissal of purposive deliberative designs that is required, but rather the right 
balance between too much and too little controlled design that is decisive for mini-publics to play a 
role in the critical dimension of deliberative democracy. In what follows, we open up a discussion on 
where that crucial balance might lie by analysing different types of mini-publics with regard to their 
emancipatory and potentially counter-emancipatory features, to determine which are decisive for 
mini-publics to enable rather than undermine bottom-up critique.  
 
Variations in Critical Capacity Between Types of Mini-Publics 
To determine what features contribute to mini-publics’ critical or uncritical roles, it is worth 
considering differences between different types. Caluwaerts and Reuchamps (2013: 27), for instance, 
demonstrate how ‘even the most basic choices’ in mini-public design such as number of participants, 
duration of the process, and the source of funding ‘have a profound impact upon the contributions 
we can expect from deliberative events to the legitimate functioning of democracy as a whole’. Thus, 
Elstub’s (2014) categorisation of several different types of mini-publics –  specifically Citizens’ Juries 
(CJ), Consensus Conferences (CC), Planning Cells (PC), Deliberative Polls (DP) and Citizen Assemblies 
(CA) – according to a range of typical features, including inclusiveness, duration, selection method, 
activities, and outputs, offers an instructive basis for this discussion. Analysing the differences 
between these different types from the perspective of bottom-up critique can help uncover what 
aspects of mini-publics are most relevant in terms of their realising (or undermining) the critical 
dimension of deliberative democracy. 
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As we argued above, the way in which mini-publics potentially contribute to citizen critique is by 
opening up an accessible space within which citizens can confront the relevant authorities and 
stakeholders with opposition to their plans (as opposed to minor sympathetic refinements of a policy 
or choosing between a narrow set of pre-given options) as well as by generating an impact on policy 
outcomes on this basis (as opposed to playing a mere advisory role). The way in which mini-publics 
undermine the critical elements of deliberative democracy is by constraining and potentially 
distorting the public discourse through top-down framing and agenda setting. Mini-publics of 
different types can be evaluated in their suitability to play a critical and emancipatory role based on 
these criteria. This does not mean that a specific type of mini-public will always result in a specific 
level of criticality, or that critique can be generated through the right design. However, it insists that 
whatever mini-public design is applied should explicitly take the critical dimension of the normative 
theory into account, and shows how common types of mini-publics would be evaluated from this 
perspective.  
Indeed, an analysis of the different types of mini-publics shows that mini-public designs differ in the 
extent to which they enable (or undermine) emancipation and critique. Elstub (2014: 171-2) 
discusses the relative differences between the different types of mini-publics with regard to 
representativeness, citizen control over the process, and decision-making impact, as illustrated in 
figure 1. Although he uses these as indicators of how democratic a mini-public is, they are 
particularly relevant for critique as well. 
Figure 1. Mini-Publics Scalar Typology 
 
Mini-Public 
Representativeness 
Citizen Control 
over Process 
Decision-making 
impact 
CJ Low/ Mod Mod Low 
CC Low/ Mod High Mod 
PC Mod/High Mod Mod 
DP High Low Low 
CA Mod/High Mod High 
 
(Elstub 2010: 172) 
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To start with, citizen control is an obvious precondition for the degree to which a mini-public can be 
genuinely critical and emancipatory. The more citizen control is constrained, the less space there is 
for the participating citizens to express their own concerns and critique, both substantively and in 
terms of how to express them. Even if a mini-public were seen to fulfil some other ends through its 
design features, a lack of citizen control indicates that the anti-emancipatory effects of its rigid 
design outweigh any gains for deliberative democracy. Similarly, decision-making impact directly 
affects the level of criticality and emancipation that a mini-public can facilitate. The less 
consequential the mini-public in terms of impact, the less effective is any critique that is expressed; 
to the point that a low or nonexistent impact of an otherwise highly critical mini-public might appear 
to cement the sponsoring authorities’ control over such processes more than representing an 
instance of challenging them. The last aspect, representativeness, is mainly relevant in terms of 
inclusiveness. Whilst a mini-public does not have to be perfectly representative to be critical, a lack 
of representativeness would raise concerns about possible distortion and exclusion in the wider 
process of citizen critique, as the views of certain groups would not be picked up. Moreover, a lack of 
diversity within mini-publics would threaten their ability to establish the deliberative setting that 
legitimates claims by testing them on their validity through the need to justify them to a 
heterogeneous audience (Manin 1987: 352; Benhabib 1996: 71-2). Based on Elstub’s analysis (Elstub 
2014: 170-2), different types of mini-publics enable citizen control and decision-making impact to 
different degrees; and whilst all aim for some (varying) degree of representativeness and can hence 
all be said to achieve at least some level of internal diversity, finer details related to this mean that 
they achieve inclusiveness and accessibility to different degrees. 
Of the different types of mini-publics, DPs allow the least citizen control and decision-making impact. 
Indeed, rather than opening up a space in which citizens can voice critique, the rationale for DPs 
typically focuses on changing, almost correcting, participants’ views: According to their creator, DPs 
are ‘a form of public education’ (Fishkin et al. 2000: 665), where ‘[t]he aim is for [participants] to 
become better informed and refine their individual views’ (Fishkin et al. 2000: 661) in order ‘to make 
the participants more like ideal citizens’ (Luskin et al. 2002: 460). The panel of “experts” typically 
includes (inevitably partisan) politicians (Luskin et al. 2002: 459-60), and citizens are formally invited 
to take part (rather than self-selecting) (e.g. Luskin et al. 2002: 463) and have no control over the 
planning and agenda of the mini-public. 
In contrast, CCs are moderately consequential in terms of decision-making impact and offer greater 
citizen control over the process (Elstub 2014: 172). Participants are not determined purely by 
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random selection, but invited and selected partly based on their interest in the issue to be discussed, 
allowing for some degree of self-selection whilst still ensuring demographic representativeness. At 
two preparatory weekends, the citizens take part in the planning of the actual mini-public, selecting 
the experts they want to question (if only from a pre-defined list) (Smith 2009: 78; Elstub 2014: 168). 
CCs are designed to create a dialogue between citizens and politicians, and the citizens’ final report is 
sent out to the Members of Parliament (Danish Board of Technology 2006). Indeed, in some cases, 
CCs have been translated into legislation (Bächtiger and Wegmann 2014: 128). 
Compared to CCs, CAs allow less citizen control over the process, but they stand out in their high 
decision-making impact (Elstub 2014: 172). The most famous CA, the British Columbia Citizens’ 
Assembly on electoral reform, engaged citizens over as long as eleven months in learning and 
deliberation (Smith 2009: 73). Although citizens are not involved in planning the mini-public, CAs still 
offer greater openness and inclusiveness than other designs in that the participating citizens run 
hearings themselves in their local constituencies (Warren and Pearse 2008: 11; Elstub 2014: 169), 
and also invite written and online submissions (Warren and Pearse 2008: 11; Smith 2009: 74). Most 
importantly, citizens decide on a final recommendation (in the case of the British Columbia CA a 
specific proposal for electoral reform), which the legislature typically (though not always [see e.g. 
Smith 2009: 75]) commits to putting to a referendum (Smith 2009: 74). 
While DPs, CCs and CAs thus sum up the two ends of the mini-public spectrum with regard to their 
potential for citizen emancipation and critique, CJs and PCs each lie somewhere in between, with low 
to moderate control and impact. Focussing therefore on DPs, on the least emancipatory end of the 
spectrum, as well as CCs and CAs, on the most emancipatory end, which of their features account for 
their respective roles? To rate mini-publics on the scales of control, impact, and representativeness, 
Elstub considers, amongst other things, their differences in terms of the methods of selection; the 
activities the mini-publics comprise; the outputs they produce; and the recipient of the output 
(Elstub 2014: 170-1). 
Selection 
Although balanced selection is important to avoid distortion of public opinion and public discourse, 
allowing a degree of self-selection to mini-publics (whilst still attenuating, as part of the procedures, 
inequalities and potential exclusion or marginalisation) enhances their potential for critique and 
emancipation in that those who wish to voice critique can take the initiative to access the mini-public 
as a channel to this end. Whilst most mini-publics select participants purely on the basis of stratified 
random sampling, CCs and CAs allow for some level of self-selection (Elstub 2014: 168-70). CCs select 
specifically for interested citizens, posting advertisements and then selecting randomly from that 
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wider self-selecting sample (Smith 2009: 81); whereas CAs allow submissions and participation in 
hearings by otherwise non-sampled citizens (Warren and Pearse 2008). DPs, on the other hand, do 
not allow self-selection. 
Activities 
Whereas the smaller mini-publics tend to comprise only an information stage and a deliberation 
stage, as highlighted above, CAs last longer and include a more thorough process of citizen input, 
including a consultation stage that goes beyond the participating citizens themselves (Elstub 2014: 
169-70; Smith 2009: 74). This is significant for critique in that short and clearly delineated activities 
constrain the space for critique, for instance by inviting views only on very specific questions and in 
specific forms. The more flexible and thorough the activities, the more power the participants have 
to use the mini-public to express their own views in their own ways. DPs, like CCs, include an 
information stage and a deliberation stage, yet there is less room for small-group discussion in DPs 
than there is in all other types of mini-publics and the comparatively short time frame and large 
groups mean that genuine expression is limited and, as a result, potentially skewed (Parkinson 2006: 
78; Smith 2009: 85). In contrast, CAs incorporate plenaries as well as small-group discussions, which 
participants in the British Columbia case felt was important for them to organise their thoughts and 
express their views in a meaningful way (Smith 2009: 85). 
Outputs 
Whereas clearly delineated, controlled outputs such as pre-defined survey questionnaires or voting 
schemes constrain the extent of critique that can be voiced, more open and flexible types of outputs, 
such as reports and open feedback, are less limiting. DPs are geared solely towards polling citizens’ 
views through surveys. This only allows for a narrow form of expression. Citizens cannot actively 
formulate their own views, but can only passively respond to the specific closed-ended survey 
questions (O’Flynn and Sood 2014). In contrast, CCs typically result in a report that sums up citizens’ 
post-deliberative views somewhat more openly (though this process can be significantly constrained, 
too). CAs stand out among the different types of mini-publics in that they result in a detailed policy 
recommendation (Elstub 2014: 170). Like a report, a policy recommendation allows for greater 
bottom-up input, and hence greater potential for critique, than narrower types of outputs such as 
opinion surveys. However, unlike a general report, a policy recommendation is tied to a very specific 
question, as well as more strongly subject to considerations of political feasibility and other 
constraints set by the status quo, which might restrict the degree to which it can effectively give 
expression to radical viewpoints. 
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Recipient 
Finally, the recipient of the output of the mini-public is significant for its critical and emancipatory 
potential in that it directly affects decision-making impact. The reason why CCs and CAs have a higher 
decision-making impact is that their recommendations are directed to formal political bodies. In the 
case of CCs, the report is addressed to both public opinion (via mass media) and parliament, whereas 
CAs are addressed to the government and result in a public referendum (Elstub 2014: 170). Unlike 
mini-publics that are addressed only to the media or the specific sponsoring body, CCs and CAs 
therefore establish channels to formal authorities that would not otherwise exist; a clear instance of 
empowerment. In contrast, DPs have so far tended to be addressed only to the sponsor and the 
media. Although DPs can attract considerable media attention, this can be a dubious publicity 
channel in that the media is often poor at conveying the details and depth of citizens’ argumentation 
at a mini-public (Parkinson 2006: 183). 
Summing up, mini-publics tend to better enable bottom-up critique and emancipation the more 
accessible they are to those wishing to take part; the more thorough and inclusive their activities are; 
the more open a form of expression their final output allows; and the more effectively they open up 
channels to convey views to those with formal decision-making power. Of the most common types of 
mini-publics, CCs and CAs tend to have the greatest emancipatory potential based on these features, 
whereas DPs so far seem to have had the least.  
However, although features have thus been identified that to some degree enhance mini-publics’ 
potential for critical emancipation, all existing types of mini-publics still remain unnecessarily limited 
in their total critical potential. For instance, while a report allows for more meaningful expression of 
citizens’ views than a survey, the report can itself be unnecessarily constrained by the procedures 
that have been set for the mini-public. Not only can the topic and sub-questions of the report be 
quite strictly delineated, but also its timing and suggested phrasing can distort what citizens might 
actually express if given a freer context to do so (see e.g. Smith 2009: 83, 89; Lang 2008; Aasen and 
Vatn 2013).  
Similarly, even if a mini-public formally opens up a channel to government authorities, there is no 
guarantee that citizens’ recommendations will be taken up, or even seriously considered. Even in the 
case of CCs in Denmark, which typically both involve and directly address members of parliament, an 
actual impact on political outcomes cannot always be observed (cf. Smith 2009: 92-3). In fact, the 
direct channel between citizens and politicians can be seen as first and foremost benefiting the 
politicians, who, apparently, ’are satisfied’ with the conferences as they ’provide [them] with 
information, which they normally do not have’ (Andersen and Jæger 1999: 334; see similarly Goodin 
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and Dryzek 2006: 229-30), yet without any obligation to act on the recommendations. CAs, on the 
other hand, do typically guarantee decision-making impact through the legislature’s commitment to 
a referendum. Yet, as observed earlier, the potential for genuine empowerment that this implies is 
undercut in turn by the lack of citizen control over the topics, framing, timing, and procedural 
conditions of CAs. Indeed, even in the widely celebrated case of the British Columbia CA, the framing 
and conditions set by the “charge” that outlined the issues for discussion foreclosed from the outset 
one of the preferred options of the Assembly (Smith 2009: 89); the design of the selection process, 
by under-representing minorities, may have skewed the outcome of the CA (James 2008; Smith 2009: 
82); and the facilitation of the deliberation resulted in an indifferent dismissal of a ‘substantive point’ 
made by the citizens related precisely to citizen empowerment (Lang 2007: 57). Thus, even the most 
consequential types of mini-publics still lend themselves to ‘misuse as a “fig leaf” of legitimation for 
predetermined outcomes’ (Niemeyer 2014: 177), whether through selective consideration of 
citizens’ recommendations or through strategic framing prior to the mini-public. 
Moreover, where mini-publics allow for some degree of self-selection, this is typically very limited. Of 
course, pure self-selection would likely fail to establish a setting of equality and thus distort the 
deliberation (Smith 2009: 21); and mini-publics are deliberately based on the concept of inviting non-
partisan citizens to discuss an issue from an unbiased, non-strategic perspective (Dryzek and Tucker 
2008: 864; Goodin and Dryzek 2006: 231). Yet limiting deliberative institutions to such non-partisan 
fora again allows for potential misuse of mini-publics to the authorities’ advantage, notably precisely 
if the mini-public has direct decision-making impact. For instance, a mini-public in Italy, of a more 
unique ‘Electronic Town Meeting’ design, was allegedly used to distract the political discourse from 
existing demands from citizen groups, who were actively excluded from the deliberation (Freschi and 
Mete 2009). In such cases, it is precisely if the mini-public is celebrated as the key reference point for 
the views of “the public”, or even accorded considerable political impact, that previous critical voices 
are effectively silenced. Once more, this shows that for the empowerment potential of consequential 
mini-publics not to be undercut by their other features, citizens must have some level of control over 
the use of mini-publics, including some sorts of channels to raise issues for debate bottom-up. 
 
Critical Mini-Publics: Emancipatory Instruments for Citizens 
Having outlined the limitations of mini-publics to deliver the required critical elements of deliberative 
democracy, we now turn to propose how they could be reformed to enhance their critical and 
emancipatory potential in line with the normative (re-)turn in deliberative democracy that we are 
calling for. Based on the above considerations, how can mini-publics achieve the right balance 
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between controlled design and a more open, critical role? In the following, we propose two possible 
normative answers to this question. Firstly, the existing typical mini-public designs could be amended 
to better incorporate bottom-up citizen initiative. Yet, inasmuch as it is such a “design approach” 
itself that entails (yet more) top-down planning and control, proposing an even more refined “design 
solution” does not suffice for a coherent answer. In addition, we argue, the ongoing evolution and 
innovation of the practice of mini-publics must itself become subject to deliberative democratisation 
(as opposed to formal oversight). We thus propose, secondly, that conceptualising mini-publics as 
part of a networked deliberative system might achieve just this. 
(Re-modelled) Mini-Publics as Channels for Voicing Critique 
To start with, mini-publics might be re-modelled to open up space for critique and avoid any 
unnecessary control. One in-built (yet to some degree necessary) limitation in this regard is that mini-
publics specifically exclude partisans, i.e. those with strong, pre-held critical views. However, 
expressions of critique do not necessarily have to be conceptualised as part of the actual mini-public 
deliberation itself. Used in a slightly different way, mini-publics could be one step of a wider process 
of voicing critique. Whilst not in themselves including partisans, they could be initiated by partisans, 
as a criterion for the partisans’ injecting their critique into the formal political arena. Recognising 
their biased and rigid position, partisans would subject their critique to a more balanced and 
unbiased mini-public that checks it, but also translates those elements of the initial critique that pass 
the deliberative test – which might otherwise have remained entirely excluded – into legitimate 
concerns to be taken up by the formal political process. 
Such a use of mini-publics goes beyond the existing typical use in that the mini-public would 
originate in an instance of bottom-up critique, rather than top-down control over the political 
process. As such, they could constitute an instrument not for authorities, but, with adequate support 
and information available, for citizens to use in a bottom-up momentum towards democratisation. 
For example, Gastil and Richards (2013: 266) propose new deliberative designs aimed at infusing 
democratic deliberation into the initiation stage of policy processes . According to their framework, 
conventional CAs could still be used to draft specific policy proposals to be put to a referendum, but 
there is no reason why the stages in the overall policy-making process prior to and following this 
specific stage should not be deliberative democratic as well. Thus, a CA could be one step in a wider 
process whose origin equally lies in bottom-up citizen deliberation. Gastil and Richards (2013: 266) 
propose a so-called ‘Priority Conference’, called for by a petition, to deliberatively determine the 
issues that citizens demand government action on. Such a petition may well be driven by partisan 
interest groups, thus representing an expression of bottom-up critique, but the Priority Conference 
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then acts as a deliberative filter of such partisan views by submitting them to a process that subjects 
them to critical, reasoned reflection from a publicly oriented perspective. Partisans may well pursue 
this approach if a mini-public had the potential to influence policy, particularly if they believed they 
had strong ‘publicly orientated’ arguments and reasons that could ‘win-out’ in a mini-public. So long 
as the ensuing mini-public also incorporates as high a degree of citizen control as possible, the initial 
biased petition could thus be turned into a publicly justifiable, common-good-oriented policy 
proposal in a way that does not amount to a top-down, authoritative suppression or distortion of 
citizen critique. 
This brings us to the next point. Moving the initiation of mini-publics into the realm of citizen control 
is a significant starting point. Yet, as we have seen, granting citizen control in one area whilst 
instantly undercutting it again through control of other areas still risks undermining citizen 
empowerment more than advancing it. Thus, the actual mini-publics would need to adopt those 
features that we have established as essential for bottom-up critique. Following the example of CCs, 
citizens should be part of the planning committee, selecting the experts to question. Beyond existing 
CCs, however, citizen oversight should extend, in one way or other, also to the timing and structure 
of the deliberation as well as the final report; and citizens should be unbound to raise and discuss 
additional questions they consider relevant, including on the charge itself (cf. Ward et al. 2003: 289; 
Tucker 2008: 144-5). Following the example of CAs, moreover, the mini-publics should be connected 
to some procedure that guarantees them political impact without overriding other democratic 
norms. This does not necessarily have to be a referendum with a decisive and final impact. A better, 
as itself more deliberative, way to guarantee uptake in the formal political process would be a legal 
commitment to a transparent, public response to the citizens’ recommendations and demands, 
coupled with a range of accessible channels for citizens to hold politicians accountable for their 
response, informing and inspiring new deliberative processes growing from that “seed bed”. Ward et 
al. (2003), for instance, propose the concept of “open citizens’ juries” that are seen as part of a wider 
and more open-ended political process. For this, mini-publics must be open and accessible, granting 
all citizens the right to respond and bear witness (Ward et al. 2003: 290). Yet, beyond such further-
going direct involvement in the specific mini-public itself, a public response could also take other 
forms, including sparking altogether new discourses and motivating all sorts of deliberative follow-up 
events and processes. In these ways, rather than as isolated instances of final decision-making, mini-
publics could be used for further ‘deliberation-making’ (Niemeyer 2014: 179) in a wider sense, 
‘nudg[ing] politics in a more deliberative direction’ more generally (Niemeyer 2014: 195). 
A re-modelling of mini-publics in this way could readjust the practical dimension of deliberative 
democracy back into line with the critical orientation of the early normative theory. Yet, by 
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establishing a new type of mini-public as a new formal procedure might itself require significant 
oversight and planning, thus doing little to move away from top-down planning and control. A better 
conceptualisation of such processes might be found in the recent shift in deliberative theory towards 
consideration of deliberative systems as opposed to separate deliberative events (Mansbridge 1999; 
Parkinson 2006; Mansbridge et al. 2012). In a dynamic, interlocking system of different deliberative 
sites and actors, we argue in the next section, the use of mini-publics could be overseen by such 
deliberative processes rather than by academic or political elites. 
Mini-Publics as Elements within a Wider Deliberative System 
Indeed, conceptualising mini-publics not as full instances, but as incomplete parts of a wider system 
of deliberative democracy allows for acknowledgement of their inevitably limited nature, 
contributing certain specific components to the overarching system but failing at providing others. 
The discussion that this opens up, around what mini-publics can and ought to contribute and which 
of their shortcomings may need to be counter-balanced elsewhere, naturally focuses the debate on a 
critical evaluation of mini-publics, which has the potential to democratise the evolving practice of 
mini-publics. 
A useful systems perspective in this regard is Knops’s (2014) account of deliberative systems as 
networks of inevitably partial instances of deliberation, which respond to and evaluate each other, 
and reinforce the normative force of the demanding deliberative norms in the process. As part of a 
dynamic network of deliberative processes of different kinds, mini-publics, provided they are fully 
transparent, could thus be naturally overseen by other deliberative processes. They would continue 
to be used as instruments in democratic policy-making processes, but as critical evaluation of their 
nature and practice would continually uncover their limitations, their problematic side-effects would 
be disarmed, and any narrow authoritative (mis)use subverted. As a consequence, it would be 
bottom-up public oversight that pushes the practice of mini-publics to evolve towards more 
democratic directions. 
Such a perspective demands not just a certain design, but sees the “success” of mini-publics as 
dependent on their embeddedness in the right kind of context. Specifically, critical mini-publics as 
instruments for citizens would demand an ethos of critical thinking and wide-spread public 
engagement with political issues, as well as the plethora of communicative and political channels 
that allow for an active public sphere, including accessible and independent media, political 
education, participatory platforms, and greater substantive equality. While mini-publics can, in a 
design geared towards ‘deliberation-making’ rather than decision-making, potentially themselves 
contribute to such a context, their realising the critical dimension of deliberative democracy 
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ultimately hinges on the existence of a much wider and more dynamic system of multiple 
interlocking instances of democratic emancipation. 
Even then, of course, the evaluative processes Knops envisions might not always materialise; and 
their preconditions, most notably a high degree of transparency and the existence of a multitude of 
effective participatory and deliberative channels, are in reality easily contradicted and counteracted 
by existing governance practices. Nevertheless, we think this perspective is at least a promising 
starting point for a normative re-conceptualisation of mini-publics in that it implies an approach to 
realising deliberative democracy that is more democratic in itself; one that demands measures that 
generally create new room for democratisation to evolve bottom-up, rather than even more fine-
grained, carefully engineered, and thus inevitably rigid institutions. 
 
Conclusion 
Over the last fifty years, democratic theory has progressed through various realpolitik and normative 
cycles. The arrival of deliberative democracy produced a significant momentum towards the latter, 
but this democratic theory has itself undergone its own discrete normative/realpolitik cycles, and the 
considerable focus afforded to mini-publics has played a prominent role in dragging deliberative 
democracy in a realpolitik direction. Although mini-publics successfully realise some aspects of the 
normative theory, they have increasingly side-lined others, most notably the critical core of early 
deliberative democratic theory. 
This need not remain so, however. Despite their in-built limitations, mini-publics can also be part of 
the solution, providing ‘normative and empirical deliberative democrats work closely together’ 
(O’Flynn and Sood 2014: 55). Once awareness exists on the potential side-effects of mini-publics, 
they can be re-directed to realise a more democratic balance between their strategic use to specific 
ends and their playing a more emancipatory, bottom-up role. We have sketched a two-pronged 
answer to this challenge. Firstly, mini-publics can be evaluated and re-designed towards greater 
citizen control over the process, more open types of outputs, and more direct channels to formal 
decision-making. Secondly, the practice of mini-publics ought itself to be subjected to bottom-up 
deliberative processes. By conceptualising mini-publics as part of an overarching network of 
deliberative exchanges that evaluate and respond to one another, the emphasis shifts towards the 
establishment of a generally more active, transparent, and democratic system, whose ongoing 
evolution need not depend on top-down steering and control. 
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With such a prospect, our paper ends on an optimistic note. The systemic perspective that promises 
to subject future experimentation with mini-publics to a dynamic democratic momentum marks 
nothing less than the cutting edge of recent deliberative democratic theory. As such, it shows that 
deliberative democracy need not become either “realpolitik” or “normative”. Rather, its strength lies 
precisely in its in-built ability to navigate both in an unceasing oscillation between normative and 
practical impulses. Inasmuch as its current stage of development illustrates that deliberative 
democracy does still remain a ‘[t]heory [that] challenges political reality’ and that is ‘critical, not 
acquiescent’ (Thompson 2008: 499) even in the face of a simultaneous ‘empirical explosion’ (Dryzek 
2010: 9) of more practice-oriented experiments with deliberation, we can safely conclude that 
deliberative democracy is rightly ‘the most successful’ democratic theory yet (Pateman 2012: 7), 
bound to continue invigorating democracy in both theory and political practice. 
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